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Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines judicial review in executive (administrative)1 action as 
an essential tool for curbing the excesses and abuse of delegated legislative 
powers in Sierra Leone based on the valid assumption that there is a system of 
administrative law due to a developed system of judicial review in Sierra Leone. 
The role of the courts in reviewing the acts and decisions of government 
departments and other public authorities is found in all common law and other 
legal systems and Sierra Leone is no exception. The authority of courts to 
declare actions of legislative or administrative body unconstitutional or ultra vires, 
therefore rendering those actions unenforceable and unlawful remain a live 
debate especially in the legal and political field. As a result of this, various 
explanations and classifications have been made as to what the concept of 
judicial review entails.  
 
For instance Burris (1987; 586) stated that the whole conceptual framework of 
judicial review is premised upon the assumption that there is a distinction 
between the power of the court to review laws to determine if they are consistent 
with the constitution, and reviewing laws to determine if they are good policy 
decisions. The latter he went on to say belongs to the political decision process 
and the former are, decisions which are the province and the duty of the judiciary 
to say what the law is. 
 
Bradley (2010; 1) stated that judicial review denotes power of the courts to 
review acts of the executive and legislature on constitutional grounds, tracing this 
foundation from the landmark case of Marbury v Madison2, where the United 
States Supreme Court declared the constitution to be the fundamental law. 
Others are of the view that judicial review was first established by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789. This Act put in place all the crucial elements of judicial review, 
including an explicit authorisation to declare federal and state laws constitutional 
(Graber, 2002-2003; 612-613).  
 
Nevertheless, what is clear from the views mentioned above is that the term 
judicial review is commonly used in relation to both administrative and 
constitutional review generally. The process is viewed as the courts’ rights to test 
any legislation or other governmental action against the constitution on 
procedural or substantive grounds. Most Commonwealth countries with 
constitutions (with the exception of the United Kingdom3), accept that the 
constitution is the fundamental law which confers certain powers on the 
legislature, executive and judicial arm of governance. The constitution normally 
                                                 
1 The words Administrative and Executive action are used interchangeable in this dissertation as both 
words in the Sierra Leonean context have often been synonymous.  
2 [1802] 1 Cranch 137. 
3 In the United Kingdom there is no “written constitution”, however acts of parliament are supreme. 
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imposes limits as well on the authority of the legislature and the executive and 
gives power to the courts (for Sierra Leone the supreme court) to determine 
matters pertaining to constitutional law. 
 
However, the origins of judicial review in the United Kingdom (from whom Sierra 
Leone inherited and adopted its laws4) are linked to certain judicial remedies 
such as the prerogative orders or writs known as certiorari, mandamus, 
prohibition and habeas corpus and also the use of declaration and injunctions 
against public authorities (Seidman, 1970-1971; 165; Wade, 1967; 42 & 46, 
Bradley, 2010; 1). These judicial remedies could be traced from the early English 
landmark cases of Cooper v Wandsworth South London Board of Works5, 
(wherein notice must be given before statutory power to demolish house could be 
exercised), Associated Provincial Pictures Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation6(wherein the level of unreasonableness of a decision-maker was 
established), Ridge v Baldwin7 (a chief constable was dismissed without a 
hearing), to the creation of the procedure of ‘application for judicial review’.  
 
Judicial review in English law has transformed in the last forty years into a 
modern and effective system of administrative law (Bradley, 2010; 2). This 
application of judicial review, Bradley (2010; 2) stated has come to be referred to 
as the special method of applying for public law remedies in the Administrative 
court, the busiest division of the High Court (in England) which saw among 
others, recent judicial review cases such as Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service8 and M v Home Office9 (Home Secretary required to 
comply with orders of court). In this light and from the fact that Sierra Leone 
inherited and adopted her laws and in particular her judicial review system largely 
from the English law, can one then assume that Sierra Leone has developed a 
similar effective system thus making it an essential tool to curtail abuse and 
excesses of delegated legislation in administrative actions? This matter which is 
the focus of this thesis will be discussed and analysed in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 ‘These rules were received in Africa under the general reception statutes, by which the British imperial 
overlords imposed the common law on their new African territories’; See R. B. Seidman, Administrative 
Law and Legitimacy in Anglophonic Africa: A problem in the Reception of Foreign Law (1970-1971)5 
Law & Soc’Y Rev 162-164& 167; J.A.D. Alie, A New History of Sierra Leone (1st edn, St Martin’s Press 
Inc, New York 1990) 62-63; C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (OUP, Oxford 1962) 97; A.P. Kup, Sierra 
Leone: A Concise History (Douglas David and Charles Limited, Vancouver 1975) 167; The Constitution of 
Sierra Leone 1991 s 170(1) (a-e). 
5 [1863] 14 CBNS 180, 143 ER 414. 
6 [1948] KB 223. 
7 [1964] AC 40 (HL). 
8 [985] AC 374 (HL). 
9 [1992] 4 All ER 97; [1993] 3 All ER 537; 1994 1 AC 377; ‚The proper constitutional relationship of the 
executive with the courts is that the courts will respect all acts of the executive within its lawful province, 
and that the executive will respect all decision of the court as to what its lawful province is’ (per Lord 
Justice Nolan). 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that judicial review is an essential tool for curbing 
the excesses and abuse of executive powers in administrative action in Sierra 
Leone. The question to be answered and facts to be established in order to prove 
the hypothesis are what are the various ways of reducing the excesses and 
abuses of delegated legislation, is judicial review one of the ways and if so, how 
does it serve (if at all) as an essential tool, and its importance in restricting the 
excesses and abuse in administrative actions. The aim and objective of this 
essay is to prove the above-mentioned hypothesis. The reason for this research 
is that judicial review in administrative action in Sierra Leone has been a 
controversial and highly debated topic by politicians, civil society, academics, the 
media and the nation as a whole. Harsh criticism has come mainly from the 
politicians who have described the process as non-effective, a waste of time and 
resources by the courts and the nation as a whole. Moreover they argue that 
judicial review undermines the principles of separation of powers and that the 
concept authorises judges to set aside the decisions of democratically elected 
legislatures. 
  
1.2 Methodology  
 
Judicial Review is a very broad subject and therefore emphasis will be on judicial 
review of Administrative (executive) action and not on judicial review of primary 
legislation. The reason for focusing on the former rather than the later aspect of 
judicial review is that the former action is normally directed towards the acts and 
omissions of other bodies or authorities who have delegated legislative powers 
(Jabbie, 1999; 99).Therefore in order to examine and prove the hypothesis, 
particular attention will be directed towards examining the theories that govern 
judicial review in administrative actions generally, the law, nature and protection 
accorded by judicial review in Sierra Leone and also of importance, the decisions 
of landmark cases in judicial review applications in Sierra Leone spanning three 
decades starting from the mid 1980’s to late 2000. This period is being used 
because this era will enable me to analyse and establish whether the use of 
judicial review application has proved essential during the course of time in 
curtailing or curbing the excesses and abuse of executive powers in Sierra 
Leone. Judicial review of administrative actions has long been recognised at 
common law by the United Kingdom from whom Sierra Leone adopted and 
inherited its judicial review principles and procedures. Therefore I am going to 
use as point of reference, the United Kingdom’s system of judicial review in 
administrative action. 
 
In furtherance to establishing my hypothesis, I will use arguments put forward by 
experts, legal professionals, jurists, and writers against and in support of the use 
and importance of judicial review as an essential means of curbing the excesses 
and abuse of delegated legislation in executive actions. The reason for using 
these arguments in conjunction with judicial review cases in Sierra Leone in the 
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analysis is that they will help in establishing whether the use of judicial review in 
curtailing excesses and abuse of administrative (executive) action has proved to 
be an essential tool and effective one use by the courts in Sierra Leone to act as 
a check and more importantly restrain the excesses and any abuse of executive 
powers. Traditionally, the theory of separation of power clearly states that each 
arm of government, meaning the legislature, executive and judiciary must work 
within its purview and not overlap or interfere into each others domain. However 
if a country is claiming to practise democracy there must be checks and balances 
especially on the executive arm of government since in most jurisdictions they 
are entrusted by the people with the responsibility of the day to day running of 
the country. Therefore the rule of law must be seen to prevail and government 
powers must be exercised according to law. Besides, there should be a 
reasonable degree or predictability as to the law, so that people may order their 
affairs accordingly (McLeod, 2009; 3). 
 
This matter may well be the reason for the development and increasing growth of 
the use of judicial review by the courts in numerous jurisdictions. Notwithstanding 
this fact, some experts have propounded various arguments against the use of 
judicial review as a means of limiting abuse or excesses of the executives’ 
action. One such arguments is that it is limited in its scope whether it takes place 
in terms of the common law or in terms of the constitution; as the doctrine of the 
separation of powers traditionally prevents the courts from reconsidering 
administrative actions on merits, and confines them to questions of process and 
procedure (Hoexter, 2000;485). Judicial review has also being criticised as 
backward-looking, marginal, negative, sporadic and peripheral, random, inapt, 
inaccessible, expensive, undemocratic and destructive (Hutchinson,1985; 294; 
Harvey,1961; 487; De Smith, et al, 1995; 3; Cane, 1996; 378). Griffith (2001; 63) 
also maintains that decisions made by public authorities made within their 
purview should be out of bounds to the courts.  
 
On the other hand, other writers, jurist and the like have supported the view that 
judicial review is an essential mechanism to curb abuses and excesses of 
executives’ action in governance (Woolf, et al, 2007; 6; Bickel, 1982; 23-28). It 
has been purported that judicial review by the courts acts as guardians of 
parliament’s will (Woolf, et al, 2007; 226). It has been put forward to be an 
important control mechanism on the government (Fordham, 2008; 10). The 
question then to answer is whether the Sierra Leonean courts have proved that 
judicial review is indeed an essential tool to curb these excesses and abuse of 
the executive’s action? Or does the courts practise of judicial review confirm the 
arguments of those writers, experts and politicians who do not support the use of 
judicial review as an essential tool to check the executives’ excesses. This 
dissertation therefore anticipates contributing to the ongoing debate of judicial 
review with an analytical perspective of the concept and how it works and what it 
has achieved (if any) from a different part of the world (Sierra Leone) wherein not 
much has been written on this area from this jurisdiction although constantly 
debated upon. This matter will be analysed with practical examples of cases 
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where courts have employed the concept in order to achieve the ends of equity, 
justice and fairness. In discussing these issues and to establish my hypothesis, I 
intend to use primary and secondary sources from which I can analyse and draw 
a valid conclusion. The structure which this dissertation will pursue is highlighted 
in the next section.  
 
1.4 Structure 
 
This dissertation comprises of five chapters. Chapter one comprise of the 
introduction in which a brief historical background has been highlighted of the 
concept of judicial review and the arguments that have been raised generally 
against and in support of the concept. In this same chapter the aims, and 
objectives and hypothesis of this dissertation have being stated, followed by the 
methodology in which the reasons for the area of focus have also being stated. 
The structures in which this piece of work will follow have also been stated. 
 
Chapter two consist of the description and discussion of the concept of judicial 
review focusing on the aspect of administrative (executive) action. Delegated 
legislation and its powers will be described briefly and the necessity of delegating 
legislation, in other words its purpose. In this same chapter the processes and 
procedure of judicial review in Sierra Leone will also be briefly discussed. 
   
Chapter 3 contains the arguments put forward in support and against the use of 
judicial review as an essential tool to curb the abuse and excesses of executive’s 
action. These arguments in conjunction with the cases will be used in the 
analysis to prove the hypothesis. 
  
Chapter 4 will further discuss and analyse whether judicial review serves as an 
essential tool to curb the abuse and excesses of executive powers, if so what is 
its importance. In this same chapter the hypothesis will be established with more 
analyses of the above stated theory, arguments and cases. Chapter 5 is a 
conclusion stating the findings of my hypothesis and some recommendations.  
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Chapter 2  
 
DESCRIPTION AND DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS 
 
2.1 The Concept of Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review represents the means by which the courts control the exercise of 
governmental power (Barnett, 2009; 685). Judicial review Barnett (2009; 685) 
observed ‘has developed to ensure that public bodies which exercise law making 
power or adjudicatory powers are kept within the confines of the power 
conferred’.  
The scope of judicial review was succinctly summarised by Lord Diplock in the 
case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 10 (also 
known as the GCHQ case as the facts concerned the Government 
Communication Headquarters), when he said: 
 
The subject matter of every judicial review is a decision… or else a 
refusal to make a decision. To qualify as a subject for judicial review the 
decision must have consequences which affect some persons (or body 
of persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him 
too. It must affect such other person either: 
(a) By altering rights or obligations of that person which are 
enforceable by or against him in private law; or 
(b) By depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either 
(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to 
enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to 
enjoy until there has been communicated to him some rational ground 
for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to 
comment; or 
(ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be 
withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons 
for contending that they should not be withdrawn….. 
For a decision to be susceptible to judicial review the decision-maker 
must be empowered by public law (and not merely… by agreement 
between private parties) to make decisions that, if validly made, will lead 
to administrative action or abstention from action by an authority 
endowed by law with executive powers, which have one or other of the 
consequences mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the ultimate 
source of the power is nearly always nowadays a statute or subordinate 
legislation made under a statute, but… may still be… ‘the prerogative’11.  
 
In other words the scope of judicial review is to ensure that decisions of public 
authorities conform to legal principles and observe fair procedures because there 
is a relationship between specific statutory rules that apply to a public service 
                                                 
10 [1985] AC 374 (HL). 
11 Ibid, pp 23-24. 
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and general principles that administrators must observe (Bradley, 2010; 2-3; 
Barnett, 2009; 685-686). It is in this light that McLeod, (2009; 6; Barnet, 2009; 
685) observed that, ‘traditionally, judicial review has been the process which 
requires courts to decide whether a decision-making process is lawful, without 
asking whether the decision itself is right’ this was illustrated in the case of Chief 
Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans12 wherein Lord Brightman said, 
‘Judicial review as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review 
of the manner in which the decision was made’13 (Barnett, 2009; 685, 691-692; 
Elliot, et al, 2005; 6). 
 
Some of the issues that the courts usually have to decide in judicial review are 
whether the person or body with law making powers had acted intra vires-acted 
within confines of power- or ultra vires (Barnett, 2009; 686). Other, enquiries of 
the court are whether there was an abuse of discretion, a breach of statutory 
procedure, failure to act fairly and a breach of human rights (which is normally 
protected by constitution or by other legislations), the list being non-exhaustive. 
With the ultra vires principle, it involves an administrator or authority acting 
beyond his or her powers, conferred by a primary legislation (Fordham, 2008; 
452). This was established in the notable case of Kruse v Johnson14 and 
illustrated in the more recent case of Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham Council15 
(wherein a local authority was speculating on future financial market) and 
perhaps not. 
 
With regards abuse of discretion, it includes exercising statutory power in a 
manner contrary to the aim of the statute, acting for improper purposes, acting in 
error of the law guiding the decision-maker’s powers, using discretion in a rigid 
manner and exercising statutory power in an unreasonable or irrational manner. 
In short, the aim of the court in judicial review is to ensure that the person or 
body with adjudicatory powers act in accordance with law, reasonably and 
according to natural justice and fairness. (Barnett, 2009; 686-687; Wade, 1967; 
49-51).  
 
What then are the remedies that judicial review offers in order to justify it as an 
essential tool in ensuring that excesses and abuses of executive actions are 
curtailed? Bradley (2010; 4) observed that the courts can make an order to 
quash an unlawful decision, prohibit the authority or official from breaking the 
law, order performance of a duty, make an order to declare the law, order to pay 
compensation and last but not the least make orders to give temporary relief 
pending definitive decision on judicial review. Supperstone, et al (2005; 454; 
Wade, 1967; 96-101) in their earlier works stated that judicial remedies include 
mandatory, prohibiting or quashing orders, a declaration or injunction and 
damages. 
                                                 
12 [1982] 3 All ER 141 (HL). 
13 Ibid, Per Lord Brightman. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone also concur this point in this case. 
14 [1898] 2 QB 91 
15 [1992] 2 AC 1(HL). 
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Notwithstanding the principles and the remedies afforded by judicial review, it 
stands with its own challenges. Besides non-justiciable matters such as 
prerogative powers, national security and the like, there are certain limitation and 
restriction clauses sometimes made in statutory provision themselves. These are 
ouster clauses, finality clauses and also time limitation of making judicial review 
applications. 
 
However these clauses have not been successful in ousting judicial review from 
its aim of acting as a safeguard for the rights of the ordinary man and a check on 
abuse and excesses of administrative actions (Woolf, et al, 2007;186). This fact 
is evident in the cases of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission16 
and R (G) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal17. In the latter case it was held that the 
common law power of judges to review the legality of administrative actions is the 
cornerstone of the rule of law and one that a judge guards jealously. This has 
being done to the extent that, the courts in affirming its jurisdictions in cases 
involving interpretation of such provisions in statutes, clauses have been 
interpreted as precluding appeals against administrative decisions but not 
excluding judicial review (Emery, 1999;181-182). This fact was further illustrated 
in the earlier case of R v Medical Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gilmore18.  
 
Applications for judicial review are normally made within specific periods, and in 
the case of Sierra Leone it is specified as no later than three months from the 
date of the occurrence of the event19. Nevertheless, it has been confirmed that 
despite time limitations on judicial review application, the reliefs can still be given 
to those affected if it is established that an act was done in bad faith as was 
illustrated in the case in Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council 20 (Barnett, 
2009; 698-699). 
 
2.2 Delegated Legislation and Administrative Law  
 
Delegated or subordinate legislation refers to legally binding provision made 
under power delegated from the legislative to the executive (Xanthaki, 2010; 1). 
Gondal (2010; 1) describes it as a type of legally binding provisions made by the 
executive or other entities under the authority given by legislature. Thornton 
(1996; 229-230& 329) defined it  as any enabling clause, proclamation, 
                                                 
16 [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL). 
17 [2005] 2 All ER 165(CA). 
18 [1957] 2 W.L.R. 498 (CA). It was held that ‘in any event the court had power to order the tribunal to 
complete the record by finding the material facts...and that the remedy by certiorari was available to quash 
a decision of the tribunal…despite the provision in section 36 (3) that any “any decision of a claim or 
question…shall be final”’. 
19 Order 52(3) (1) of the High Court Rules 2007(Sierra Leone). 
20 [1956] 2 W.L.R. 888 (HL). It was held that despite the clear wording of the time limit in the statute and 
the fact that Mrs smith did not challenge the order within the time limit until after six years, the House of 
Lords unanimously agreed that she could proceed against the clerk to the Council for damages on the basis 
of bad faith in procuring the order. 
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regulation, rule, by-law, order, notice, rule of court, town planning scheme, 
resolution, or other instrument made under the authority of any written law and 
having legislative effect. Delegated legislation must flow from the primary 
legislation. ‘It is common form for delegated legislation to open with preamble 
reciting that the person making it has done so in exercise of certain specified 
powers….’(McLeod, (2009; 20)21.  
 
Delegated legislation has grown out of necessity and for practical purposes. It is 
looked upon as a necessary evil, an unfortunate but inevitable infringement of the 
separation of powers (Wade, 1967; 291; Wade & Forsyth, 1994; 859). As De 
Smith (1949; 517) observed, ‘ parliament cannot be expected to pass a new act 
every time it is desired to amend a statutory schedule of dangerous drugs, or to 
take extraordinary measures to deal with a stoppage of work in the public utility 
services’. Gondal (2010; 1) pointed out that, delegated legislation is an essential 
part of modern legislation. Taking into consideration the numerous issues 
parliament has to deal with, it is virtually impossible for parliament to make all 
laws and oversee all activities of the executive. Therefore parliament is obliged to 
delegate extensive law-making power over matters of detail and to content itself 
with providing a framework of more or less permanent statutes (Wade & Forsyth, 
1994; 859).  
 
Parliament cannot possibly control the ordinary day-to-day running of 
governmental acts except by taking up occasional cases which have political 
appeal (Wade, 1967; 11, 291-294). Moreover, it gives more time to important 
policy decisions and provides flexibility and responsiveness. Delegated 
legislation provides more space for prescribing details in that it focuses on minute 
details of the law, as it is impossible to put all details in primary legislation. It also 
helps in explaining the technicalities of a subject for the implementation of 
primary legislation and does introduce administrative arrangements necessary 
for primary legislation (Xanthaki, 2010; 1). Furthermore it bridges the gap 
between the pace of social changes and law. Last but not the least; it is the 
bedrock for rule of law, justice, human rights, good governance and economic 
development. 
 
As a result of the great latitude that delegated legislation gives to those 
responsible in exercising its powers, this fact clearly encourages abuse. As 
Bickel (1962; 17) mentioned ‘elected officials… are expected to delegate some of 
their tasks to men of their own appointment, who are not directly accountable… 
The whole operates under public scrutiny and criticism- but not at all times or all 
parts’. The various abuse and excesses highlighted in the previous section may 
arise from the substantive part of the primary legislation. For instance, if the 
enabling clause in the primary legislation is not properly drafted, the executive 
will go beyond the main principles laid down to exercise power and fall back on 
political viewpoints.  
 
                                                 
21 This fact was cited in the leading case of Vibixa Ltd v Komori UK Ltd [2006] 4 All ER 294(CA). 
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Furthermore abuse may also occur if the enabling clause does not specify the 
time delegated legislation is to begin and by whom. In such instance the 
executive in the ministry or department responsible for carrying out the delegated 
legislation may institute there own time and sub-delegate without authority which 
is a form of abuse (Gondal (2010; 1). With excesses and abuse being imminent 
and constantly perpetuated, it is no wonder that safeguards such as the drafting 
of a well thought out enabling clause that specify the objectives and purpose of a 
delegated legislation is set out, the authority to carry out the delegated legislation 
and the procedure in which it should be done are being suggested and used. 
Another safeguard is parliament oversight (Gondal (2010; 1). A further safeguard 
is the use of the local government ombudsman (Bridges, et al., 1995; 11).  
 
Nonetheless the essential and most effective safeguard that has being put 
forward by some experts, writer and jurists, and used by many jurisdiction in 
curtailing the excesses and abuse of executive actions is judicial review (which is 
the focus of this dissertation) though it has been criticised by others as being 
narrow to constitutional and enabling clause or natural justice principles, too 
expensive and time consuming among other things (Gondal (2010; 1). Wade and 
Forsyth observed (1994; 874-875) that ‘…the courts must determine the validity 
of delegated legislation… for there is a fundamental difference between a 
sovereign and a subordinate law-making power’. 
 
Administrative law 
 
The use of Prerogative Writs to compel statutory boards, public officials, public 
bodies, boards, tribunals and corporations to act judicially when determining 
rights of citizens has increased tremendously, thus the wide use of the Writs of 
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and injunction has led to the growth of a large 
body of law which we now call ‘Administrative law’ (Chongwe, 1989; 620; Woolf, 
2007; 6-8). It developed as a response to the growth of the modern 
administrative state with its role of organising services for the people. This role of 
centralised administration resulted into disputes between individuals and the 
states and the principle of administrative law grew out of judicial decisions to 
regulate these relations between citizens and the state (Chongwe, 1989; 620; 
Woolf, 2007; 6-8).  
 
Administrative law therefore is primarily concerned with regulating exercise of the 
powers of public authorities so as to protect the citizen against their abuse (Elliot, 
et al, 2005; 2). Wade (1967; 2) described it as ‘…law concerned with the 
operation and control of the powers of administrative authorities, with emphasis 
on function rather than structure’. It is without a doubt that some kind of 
administrative law exists in every country and authorities in this division makes 
secondary legislation. It provides a firm basis for the guidance of ministers of 
government and civil servants in the discharge of their duties (Woolf, et al, 2007; 
355-357).  By upholding the principles of administrative law, in particular through 
judicial review, the judiciary serves the public interest, not only on specific cases 
R6809-ALS 15
but provide both guidelines for future administration and remedies where these 
are appropriate and where proper procedures have not been followed (Fordham, 
2008; 123). This function of the judiciary however builds a creative tension 
between the two branches of government- the executive and the judiciary- which 
works for the benefit of the public (Elliot, 2005;11). It is clear that whiles it lies 
with the executive government to make and execute policy; it rests with the 
judiciary22 to ensure that policies are implemented within the parameters 
prescribed by the constitution and statutes of the country and for its decisions to 
be respected (Fordham, 2008; 122-123; Woolf, et al, 2007; 227).  
 
The essential requirements of administrative law are that administrative action 
are to be concerned with areas authorized by the law and that the rules of natural 
justice and fairness be followed. Other requirements are that cases should be 
dealt with on its merits and that similar cases be treated in the same way. It is 
also important to note that persons taking decisions should not have any 
personal or other interest in the outcome (Barnett, 2009 685-686). At this point 
one may then ask what are the guiding principles that executive authorities 
should follow when exercising law-making powers (especially discretionary 
powers) vested in them? The administrative authority should pursue only the 
purposes for which the power has been conferred, the power must be exercised 
without bias and objectivity and impartiality must be the focus23 (Elliot, et al, 
2005; 1-2). The principle of equality before the law must be the standard in order 
to avoid unfair discrimination in administrative actions (Fordham, 2008; 122). 
Also a proper balance is to be maintained between any adverse effects which its 
decision may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons and the purpose 
which it pursues (Elliot, 2005; 8). Furthermore it is pertinent that guidelines 
governing administrative action must be followed in a consistent and lawful 
manner (Wade, 1967; 42; Barnett, 2009; 685) 
 
2.3 Judicial Review in Sierra Leone 
 
Judicial review of administrative action is exercised by the High court and the 
Supreme Court (the highest court in the land)24. Section 134 of the constitution 
which empowers the High Court to hear and determine applications of judicial 
review states that: 
 
The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all 
inferior and traditional Courts in Sierra Leone and adjudication 
authority, and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall 
have power to issue such directions, writs and orders, including 
writs of habeas corpus, and orders of certiorari, mandamus and 
                                                 
22 Sections 122,124, 125 &134 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991). 
23 Bobb v Manning [2006] 4 LRC 735, pp 14. In this case it was stressed that those exercising public power 
should do so lawfully. 
24 Sections 134 and 125 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991) respectively. 
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prohibition as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of 
enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers. 
 
Section 125 empowering the Supreme Court for the hearing and determination of 
judicial review applications states that: 
 
The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all 
other Courts in Sierra Leone and over any adjudicating authority; 
and in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to 
issue such directions, orders or writs including writs of habeas 
corpus, orders of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition as it may 
consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the 
enforcement of its supervisory powers.  
 
The source of power of the courts to hear and determine judicial review 
applications is enshrined in common law and in the constitution of Sierra Leone 
as indicated above, and by sections 171 (11) (a) of the same Constitution which 
provides as follows: 
 
Where any power - 
(a) is conferred by this constitution to make any order, 
regulation, rule or pass any resolution or give any direction 
or make any declaration or designation, it shall be deemed 
to include the power, exercisable in like manner and subject 
to the like conditions, if any, to amend or revoke any such 
order, regulation, rule, constitutional or statutory instrument, 
resolution, direction, declaration or designation as the case 
may be. 
 
The application and procedure of judicial review is further enshrined under 
Order 52 of the High Court Rules 2007 which lays down cases appropriate 
for the application for judicial review25, the time for application, the 
remedies available and the general rules of procedure for the hearing of 
such application.26 An application can be made by any person aggrieved 
by the decision or actions of the ministers, local and statutory authorities, 
public officers as the case may be. The High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Sierra Leone do review the legality of the acts of public authorities 
and apply the law to those authorities.  
 
It is important to state at this point that when they do sit in such matters, 
they do not sit in appeal from administrative decision-makers, they review 
any abuse or excesses perpetuated by these decision-makers whom 
adjudicating powers have been vested on even though these courts do 
have appellate jurisdiction. Like most jurisdictions, in Sierra Leone there 
                                                 
25 Order 52 Rule 1 of the Sierra Leone High Court Rules 2007. 
26 Ibid Rules 2-10. 
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are matters that are not amenable by judicial review application such as 
prerogative powers, issues of national security, policies that are highly 
politicised27 and decisions without legal effect (Woolf, et al, 2007;123). 
The remedies offered by the courts in Sierra Leone on the application for 
judicial review are the prohibiting or quashing orders of certiorari or 
mandamus, injunction, declaration and damages as the case may be28.  
 
It is clear at least from the sources of power and the procedures being laid 
down by statutes mentioned above that judicial review has developed 
gradually to the point that it is being enshrined in statutes and that it deals 
with disputes between government and the individual. It is in this light that 
judicial review is traditionally viewed in Sierra Leone as the court’s power 
to police the legality of government decisions. It is also referred to as the 
courts exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. It is evident that they are 
concerned about whether the actions of the government (executive) meet 
certain legal standards in the law of employment, education, licensing, and 
immigration, (to name but a few examples of areas of law and 
governance) and to prevent abuse in the exercise of executive decisions.  
 
The reviewing court will often consider whether the agency acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously or contrary to law (Frickey & Smith, 2001; 2). The 
courts also promote the rule of law and procedural fairness and act in 
support of parliament (Fordham, 2008; 122). The purpose of the 
application in Sierra Leone is to test the lawfulness of decisions of 
ministers, public officers, local councils or public bodies. Having stated 
these facts, the arguments in favour and against the use of judicial review 
as a means of curbing the excesses and abuse of executive action will 
now be examined and analysed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Sections 4- 12 & 14 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991); H. Barnett, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law (Routledge-Cavendish: Abingdon 2009) 689, gave examples of non-justiciable 
matters which are more or less the same in Sierra Leone. Matters of public policy not for judicial review 
were also illustrated in the case of Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1986] A.C.240 (HL). 
28 These remedies are clearly stipulated in Order 52 rule 8, 9 & 10 of the Sierra Leone High Court Rules 
2007.  
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Chapter 3 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST AND IN SUPPORT OF THE USE OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONEAN JUDICIAL REVIEW CASES 
SPANNING THREE DECADES 
 
3.1 Criticisms of the use of judicial review 
 
Judicial review has been criticised in many ways. First, that it leaves out of 
account many administrative matters that are not amenable to resolution by a 
court of law, meaning non-justiciable matters (Fuller, 1978-79; 353). Secondly 
that there is no assurance that administrators learn from the case-law or that they 
generally refine their behaviour in response to what the reviewing judges say 
about it (Hutchinson, 1985; 317). For some administrators rather than improve, 
may adopt an undesirable and defensive behaviour designed to minimise the risk 
of challenge (Cane, 1996; 378). Hutchinson (1985; 323) further stated that 
judicial review is marginal or peripheral and in some instances, irrelevant. He 
also observed that viewing judicial review as the solution to restraining abuse of 
executive actions, reinforces ‘ the mistaken belief that the courts lie at the heart 
of the legal and political process’ and insulates and shields the real sources of 
bureaucratic maladministration from sustained exposure and eradication’. 
 
Judicial review has been criticised as being backward-looking or negative 
because instead of building up a positive, prospective picture of what good 
administration should be, it focuses on past maladministration or past defects in 
decision making (Cane, 1996; 378). De Smith, et al, 1995; 4) observed that 
judicial review is ‘sporadic and peripheral’ because it is unsystematic. ‘It does not 
occur on a regular or consistent basis, but rather contingent on the appearance 
of applicants with time, money and standing to pursue particular disputes that 
happen to interest them’ (Cane, 1996; 378). Besides, Harlow and Rawlings 
(1984; 258) stated that ‘… the number of judicial review cases in infinitesimal 
compared with the millions of decisions taken daily by public authorities’. Judicial 
review is inappropriate because adjudication is unsuited to many kinds of 
administrative action particularly the complex decision making that is so common 
in administrative processes (Fuller, 1978-79; 353). It is inaccessible in the same 
manner as many other court-based processes, being slow, expensive and deeply 
mysterious to the layperson (Hoexter, 2000; 490).  
 
Judicial review is further criticised as undemocratic in that it permits the judiciary 
to usurp the powers of the executive. It is generally understood that parliament 
delegates’ power to the executive to implement policies based partly on the 
expertise of administrators. Judges however generally lacks this expertise but is 
permitted to interfere with executive decisions by applying the various grounds of 
judicial review to them. It is in this light that judicial review of executives’ actions 
is viewed as undemocratic and threatens the separation of powers (Hoexter, 
2000; 490). Griffith (2001;63-64) argues for a much more limited conception of 
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judicial review, opposing that ‘ review of substantive policy decisions made by 
public authorities acting within the four corners of their statutory or prerogative 
powers should be out of bounds to the courts’. 
 
3.2. Arguments in support of the use of judicial review 
 
Woolf, et al (2007; 6) states that judicial review seek to achieve broader political 
accountability. According to them, judicial review proceedings may prompt 
parliamentary action in to rectifying the delegated legislative powers that may 
have been abused. It is further highlighted by Woolf, et al, (2007;7) that judicial 
review ‘also goes some way to answering the age old question of “who guards 
the guards?” by ensuring that public authorities responsible for ensuring 
accountability of government do so within the boundaries of their own lawful 
powers’. Put in another way the judiciary by the use of judicial review acts as 
guardians of parliament’s will, seeking to ensure that the exercise of power is in 
accordance with the scope and purpose of parliament’s enactments (Woolf, et al, 
2007; 226).  
 
Barnett (2009; 686) argues that it is through judicial review that the requirements 
of legality of the exercise of powers by public bodies is tested; because how else 
would an individual or body of persons aggrieved by an administrative or 
executive decision and their rights adversely affected seek redress? Woolf, et al, 
2007; 226-227) also observes that judicial review is essential in that it improves 
the quality of decisions and decision-making processes by promoting compliance 
with law, law in this sense encompasses procedures set in legislation and the 
broad principles that are articulated through the common law (Woolf, 2007;33). 
Bickel (1982; 23-28) argues that judicial review contributes to a government that 
derives its legitimacy from democratic participation because it advances the 
interest citizens share in a government. He further observed that, the court by 
judicial review enforces the principles people share but which sometimes is 
ignored by the legislature due to their inability to achieve ‘the creative 
establishment and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules’.  
 
 In supporting the practise of judicial review, Fordham (2008; 10) observed that ‘it 
is an important control ventilating a host of varied types of problem ranging from 
matters of grave public concern to those of acute personal interest; from general 
policy to individual discretion; from social controversy to commercial self-interest; 
and anything in between’. He also argued that judicial review ensures that public 
bodies are not “above the law”. It outweighs any inconvenience or chaos cause 
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in governance29 and that it acts as a protection to the individual from injustice and 
oppression30. 
 
 
3.3 Analysis of arguments and cases of judicial review application in Sierra 
Leone 
Courts do not interfere by judicial review when powers are intra vires, as the 
central idea here is that in reviewing government action, the courts are merely 
doing parliament’s bidding by enforcing the limits upon power which are found 
(expressly or impliedly) in statute (Elliot, et al 2005; 12). Judicial review today can 
not be described to be sporadic and peripheral as the principles developed 
through judicial review over the years have become central to all of public 
administration in so far as those principles seek to enhance both the way 
decisions are reached and the quality of the decisions made (De Smith, et al, 
1999; 21; 2007; 5). The argument that the costs of judicial review far outweigh its 
benefits in curbing maladministration and making government accountable is in 
fact the opposite case for Sierra Leone. This is a fact because when one 
compares the cost of a ten year war that was primarily caused by gross 
maladministration of the executive to the cost of empowering the courts to have a 
judicial review system and an effective one; it becomes crystal clear that it is less 
costly to have a judicial review system than the consequences of not having one. 
Besides, the principles of good administration do not come cheap and the 
requirements for attaining fairness and justice can be on the whole expensive but 
a worthy cause. 
  
The criticism that judges must confined themselves to questions of process and 
procedure and not the merits of the administrative decision may be unrealistic 
because ‘in the end all but the narrowest zone of choice could be deemed to be a 
matter affecting the legality of the decision and not its merits’ (Baxter, 1984; 306). 
This is as a result of the popularity of administrative power and administrative 
relationships in modern times, and the simultaneous breadth of the grounds of 
judicial review. The area of government with which administrative law is chiefly 
concerned (the executive) is responsible for the practical running of the country 
on a daily basis with unfettered discretionary powers vested in them by the 
legislation. Everyone is affected daily by them. Therefore to balance this grand 
scale empowerment of administrators and the propensity of their decisions 
affecting citizens, the grounds and scope of judicial review of judges in 
administrative abuse and excesses is very essential to maintain such balance 
and restraint in Sierra Leone.   
 
                                                 
29 R (Refugee Legal Centre) v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2005] 1 WLR 2219 (CA), pp 8. 
It was stated that ‘Government is not entitled to sacrifice fairness on the altar of speed and convenience, 
much less of expediency; and whether it has done so is a question of law for the courts’. 
30 Nagel v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633 (CA), pp. 654F-G. Lord Justice Salmon stated that ‘one of the principal 
functions of our courts is, whenever possible, to protect the individual from injustice and oppression. It is 
important… that we should not abdicate that function’. 
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Taking into consideration the past neglect of judges in the hearing of judicial 
review application due to a dictatorial regime of governance in Sierra Leone 
between the early 1970’s to mid 1980’s (which led partly to the rebel war), it is 
difficult now for the court to resist the temptation to intervene on behalf of an 
aggrieved party who has no other remedy (Galligan, 1982; 269). They have 
become increasingly willing to subject the conduct of public authorities to judicial 
review and in peculiar cases, actions of bodies that might reasonably be carrying 
out both public and private functions as was in the case of Alie Basma v The 
Registrar of Companies and Celtel Limited31. In this matter, the respondent who 
is the Administrator and Registrar- General, (responsible for registering private 
companies), refused to register the Applicant who was the first company to apply 
to be registered under a certain name. She however, registered the second 
respondent (who applied after the Applicant) under the said name without giving 
any justification legal or otherwise for her actions. The presiding judge in his 
ruling stated that: 
 
…It is argued that in refusing the applicant’s application for 
registration, she was merely carrying out an administrative 
function, my answer to that argument would be that in the 
absence of any new machinery to address administrative 
complaints… the Complainants has no alternative but to utilise 
that which is presently available, judicial review…32 
 
Taking into consideration the list of criticisms offered above, it is rather a 
contradictory assessment in that if on the one hand judicial review is marginal or 
irrelevant and potentially destructive, it stand to reason that if it is really so 
marginal surely its destructive effects will be peripheral too and thus not worth 
worrying about. Furthermore the normative effects of judicial review may be far 
greater than its critics imagine. This is due to the fact that, the publicity and 
respect accorded to court proceedings means that an individual decision has the 
tendency to influence the outcome of many other disputes (Cane, 1996;5)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 [2008] MISC.APP.445/08. 
32 Ibid, pp 8. 
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Chapter 4 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW SERVES AS ESSENTIAL TOOL TO CURB EXCESSES 
AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 
 
4.1 Analyses of Sierra Leone Judicial Review Cases 
 
From the mid-1970’s to early 1990’s Sierra Leone was under a one-party 
dictatorial government in which, judges were under the wimps and caprices of 
the government and therefore judicial review applications were few and bias as 
judges were afraid for their lives. It was only in 1992 when a military 
government33  took over power that Sierra Leone witness an increase in judicial 
review application in which the remedies applied for were granted to the 
applicants as it emerged in the case of Kamara v The Attorney General34. In this 
case, it was held that a judicial or quasi-judicial decision reached by a tribunal in 
violation of the rules of natural justice is to be quashed on certiorari. In another 
highly publicised case of The State and the Hon Justice Gbow (Judge) v. Julius 
Spencer &others35, the judges of the Supreme Court granted the Orders of 
mandamus, prohibition and certiorari to the applicants (Julius Spencer & others), 
quashing the orders of an inferior court without fear or favour in the governance 
of the then National Provisional Ruling Council military junta who had accused 
and secured a judgement against the applicants for ‘seditious publication, 
publishing defamatory libel, publishing false reports likely to injure the reputation 
of the Government of Sierra Leone, knowingly publishing false defamatory libel 
and publishing false report likely to disturb the public peace’36. 
 
It is important to state that whiles the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Sierra Leone hears, determine and grant remedies of judicial review without fear 
or favour to all who were aggrieved over one abuse of power or another; they 
also did not allow citizens to abuse the process as established in the cases of 
The State v Alghassim Jah 37, The State v LT. COL. C. N. Deen 38, Dr. Harry Will 
v Attorney- General 39. This stance by the Court also included lawyers who 
wanted to waste the courts time40 and judges who thought they were above the 
law as was demonstrated in the case of Honourable Justice Muctaru Ola Taju-
Deen v The Commissioner of the Anti- Corruption Commission and The Anti-
Corruption Commission and The State41. In this case, the above named judge 
                                                 
33 The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) took over power from the one-party dictatorship of the 
All Peoples’ Congress (APC) Government in a coup-d’etat in 1992. 
34 [1992] SC. MISC. APP. NO. 4/92. 
35 [1993] SC. MISC. APP. NO. 6/93A&B. 
36 Ibid, pp 152. 
37 [1994] SC.MISC.APP. 1/94. 
38 [1995] MISC. APP. 1/95. 
39 [1999] SC. MISC.APP.6/99. 
40 Hon. Kakpindi Jamiru and Hon. Joseph Sallu Conteh v Dr. John Karefa-Smart, [2000], SC3/ 97. 
41 [2000] SC. MISC.APP. 6/2000; [2001] SC.MISC.APP.1/2001. A further application for Prohibition was 
also dismissed by the Supreme Court. 
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was charged on a 12 count indictment from the Anti- Corruption Commission and 
charge to court by the Attorney- General. Whiles his trial was going on he applied 
to another judge of the High Court for leave to proceed on certiorari for the report 
of the Commission on him to be quashed. His leave to make the application was 
granted but the application itself was dismissed. He made another application (ex 
parte) for certiorari to the Supreme Court in which he failed to make full and frank 
disclose of the material fact that he had already made such application to the 
High Court and was refused. The Supreme Court who was not aware of the 
preceding circumstance granted the order based on the available facts. The 
Attorney-General upon being served the order granted to the applicant by the 
Supreme Court, immediately made an application for the order to be discharge 
by the Supreme Court to which they upon hearing the full facts ‘discharge the 
Order nisi pronounced by this court on the 19th December, 2000…’42. 
 
Nevertheless, the review of the executives’ actions is ineffective if the courts 
themselves are not vigilant Jalloh v National Insurance Co. LTD43. The judiciary 
needs to be committed and efficient in dealing with matters under review and 
must be courageous to redress the aggrieved against maladministration, 
arbitrariness and injustice, otherwise the role of judicial review will be defeated. 
This is the reason why the increasing growth of judicial review of administrative 
action has been seen by many as a valuable development and that an 
independent, impartial and informed judiciary holds a central place in the 
realization of a just and accountable government which the ordinary citizen is 
entitled to in Sierra Leone. 
 
It is apparent therefore from the above cases that judicial review has become 
even more vibrant and significant in Sierra Leone, the recent past of war and the 
reasons for it has played a central role in judicial intervention by review to ensure 
ultimate sanction against abuse and excess of power. It is important to reiterate 
that before the war in Sierra Leone; the application for judicial review was few 
and far in-between in comparison to recent times. It is, now likely to remain the 
most visible and significant method of dealing with maladministration for some 
time to come due to the increasing and effective use of it by the courts in Sierra 
Leone.44 
 
4.2 How Judicial Review serves as an essential tool 
 
The basic proposition of delegated legislation is that where parliament has 
delegated a decision-function to a particular person, parliament wants that 
person to perform that function and no one else, however practicality 
                                                 
42 Ibid, pp 365. 
43 [1986] SC.  MISC. App. No. 2/86. In this case, the applicant’s application was refused. It was the period 
of a one party dictatorship in Sierra Leone and the case was between a government company and a poor 
widow whose matrimonial home was ordered to be given to the company.  
44 Alhaji Abdulai Bangura v Sierra Leone National Petroleum Company Limited & Others, [2006] SC. 
MISC.APP. 4/2006. In this case the Supreme Court asserted their authority to hear and determine judicial 
review application. 
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necessitates that civil servants or public officer exercise these powers (McLeod, 
(2009; 14). These delegated powers can be so powerful that decisions can be 
made on discretions alone. For instance some acts provide that the empowered 
executive may exercise his discretion as ‘he thinks fit and proper’45. Such wide 
discretion to interpret a statute contains inadequate guidelines wherein the 
executive may fall back on political and bureaucratic perspective which may 
clearly encourage impartiality, nepotism and abuse of power. And ‘every act of 
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is 
exercised, is void’ (Cogan, 1986-1987; 1154).  
 
Furthermore, judicial review gives the citizens notice of what rights they have and 
what actions the government, or any other institution or individual is prohibited 
from engaging in at the expense of the individual’s rights. It is for such reasons 
mentioned above that the remedy and protection that judicial review offers is 
widely used and seen as an essential mechanism.  It is mind-boggling to 
speculate what would be the fate of citizens when they become affected by such 
unchecked discretions and without a remedy. Thus the courts through judicial 
review applications engage in a supervisory role by ensuring that there is limited 
or no excess or abuse of executive power. This exercise by the judiciary does not 
mean that it is usurping the powers of the executive; it is merely delineating the 
executives’ permissible scope of discretions.  
 
It is in this vein that Lord Diplock in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service46 stated that ‘judicial review provided the means by 
which judicial control of administrative action is exercised’. It is also in this light 
that Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone said that the court is ‘… not intended to 
take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in 
them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is 
intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper 
manner’47. The courts have often exercised this form of over sight function with 
respect to the legislature. There is no reason why the judiciary cannot exercise 
the same function with respect to the executive. After all, why should the 
executive powers to implement policies, a product of legislative delegation not be 
checked as well? 
 
4.3 The Importance of Judicial Review in curtailing excesses and abuse of 
executive actions 
 
From the arguments and analyses above, one can deduce that judicial review is 
inherently essential to protect politically powerless minorities against majoritarian 
excesses (Ely, 1980; 73-179). Arbitrariness in official action offends the rule of 
                                                 
45 For instance section 24 of the Mines and Minerals Act 2009 (Act No. 3) ‘authorises the minister as “he 
may determine’ authorise any person to undertake non-commercial investigations into the geological or 
mineral resource of Sierra Leone”. 
46 Supra n. 9. 
47 Supra n.11 
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law (MacLauchlan, 1984; 435). The rule of law is the backbone of judicial review 
making it a means of checking abuse of those in the reins of power, lest they 
forget that no one is above the law (Fordham, 2008; 122). It is the foundation in 
attaining equity, fairness, justice and democracy. 
 
Because the executive makes the day-to-day regulations and adjudicate issues 
under those regulations, they suffer from the conflict inherent in trying to make 
their adjudication serve principles rather than their regulations. By this action, 
very little real protection exists for the individual in an administrative adjudication 
(Cogan, 1986-1987; 1169). Therefore if an executive abuses its discretion, then 
the judiciary using its supervisory powers should be able to clarify what is 
required through statutory construction and legislature’s intent without bias. The 
legislature cannot always oversee every executive’s action. It delegates power to 
the executive because it lacks the time and resource; its primary function being 
legislating laws for the nation. Therefore unless the judiciary’s power to review is 
given sufficient effect to curb the executives’ abuse of delegated powers and 
discretions, the executives’ action becomes effectively unchecked. Moreover, the 
judiciary in most occasions is particularly suited to deal impartially with politically 
charged issues as their function is not to be popular to majority caprices, but to 
be mindful of and faithful to the requirements of the law. 
 
Judicial review is entirely consistent with democratic practices for the actions of 
government to be scrutinized by the courts at the instance of citizens, to ensure 
that decisions taken and administrative practices followed comply in all respects 
with the constitution, with relevant statute and other laws and also with 
administrative practices in the sense that administrative decisions be taken fairly, 
reasonably and according to law. It brings the laws’ practical application into step 
with how these laws should be practiced. It does not merely require that the 
courts make sure constitutional principles are followed, but also that statutory 
laws and statutory delegations to the executive are carefully restricted to prevent 
any abuse of discretion notwithstanding the fact that the standards of review 
differ from country to country. 
 
 Another importance is that by providing for judicial review of administrative or 
executive actions, the law provides not only a means for citizens to seek redress 
where they believe they have a grievance against official action, but also for good 
administrative practice to be actively promoted as mentioned the previous 
chapters. The level of relevance of judicial review was summarised by Lindley 
MR in the case of Roberts v Gwyrfai District Council48 when he said ‘I know of no 
duty of the court which it is more important to observe, and no power of the Court 
which is more important to enforce, than its power of keeping public bodies within 
their rights’. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 [1899] 2 Ch 608 (CA), pp 614. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
 
From the above analysis it is apparent that despite the arguments against the 
principles of judicial review, the limitations and restrictions, judicial review still 
remains an essential tool and safeguard in Sierra Leone which is available to 
citizens against maladministration and arbitrariness on the part of executive 
powers. 
 
What this essay attempted to prove is that judicial review is an essential 
mechanism to curtail the excesses and abuse of executive (Administrative) 
action in Sierra Leone. From research done it appears that there is indeed a 
system of judicial review of administrative action (which was the focus of this 
dissertation) and judicial review of primary legislation. It was discovered that 
judicial review of administrative or executive action by the courts is concerned 
with the courts ensuring that decisions of public authorities conform to legal 
principles and observe fair procedures in the exercise of the delegated powers 
entrusted to the executive arm of government (Barnett, 2009; 685; Wade & 
Forsyth, 1994; 4-6).  
 
However, as with most legal principles, there are certain limitations, restrictions 
and surrounding circumstances that may limit the courts application in their 
power to review. Nevertheless, as have been highlighted above, these limitations 
have had little success in ousting the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts in 
Sierra Leone. It was established that out of necessity and practicality there is the 
need for delegating legislation to the executive as parliament cannot make all 
legislation and the executive is the body empowered to implement or carry out 
these administrative action on a daily basis with certain powers. It was further 
highlighted that these powers can be abused and used in excesses; therefore 
there are couple of mechanisms used by the legislature and the judiciary to 
check these excesses and abuse of executive action. Judicial review has being 
identified as the most effective and essential mechanism from the rest generally. 
However judicial review being an effective and essential mechanism for some 
jurisdiction does not automatically and necessarily mean that it is an essential 
tool to check the excesses and abuse of executive actions in Sierra Leone as 
most jurisdiction (even though they may have the same legal systems) differ 
vastly in terms of size, economic and social strength and human resources which 
can be a mitigating factor. Besides, what may work for one jurisdiction may not 
work for another jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, taking into consideration that Sierra Leone was involved in a 
brutal war for ten years (1991-2001) and only just trying amidst the global 
economic recession to revive its economic and social strength and build up 
the integrity of its legal system and courts in particular, the use of the 
application of judicial review was investigated using the theories that guard 
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the concepts and cases of judicial review establishing the theory in 
conjunction with Sierra Leonean cases spanning three decades.  
It has been established that despite the restrictions and shortcomings 
experienced by the courts in Sierra Leone, judicial review has proved to be an 
essential and an effective tool in curbing the excesses and abuse of 
administrative (executive) action in Sierra Leone. However, although it has 
proved essential a separate Administrative Court has not yet being set up to 
deal with judicial review matters like the English Courts has done. It has also 
been established that judicial review is a necessary application that should be 
enshrined in statutes, diligently practised with vigilance and impartiality by the 
courts and in fairness49 and transparency if the rule of law, natural justice, 
equity and democracy is to prevail in a society.  
From the facts raised above, it is clear that an independent and fearless 
judiciary, are important requirements for judicial review as an essential 
measure to check and restrain abuse and excess of executive powers. In 
almost all cases, the executive may have a political agenda separate from 
that of the legislature who empowered the executive to implement laws made 
by them. For instance an administration that is concern with budget reduction 
may require that the executive reduces its expenditure in every way possible. 
The executive in defiance may undermine the policy process and in return, 
the legislature may refuse to clearly state its objectives in an enabling statute 
because those objectives though necessary, are politically volatile. The 
enabling clause will be drafted in an ambiguous manner thus giving the 
executive an unbridled discretion which is dangerous. In such situation, one 
cannot help but agree that the judiciary by judicial review is the best 
mechanism presently for critical control of the executives’ action. And 
besides, ‘all subordinate power must have legal limits somewhere (Wade & 
Forsyth, 1994; 888) 
It is from these perspectives that one can conclude that judicial review is an 
essential tool to curtail the abuse and excesses in administrative action in 
Sierra Leone. Although, one must state that the application of judicial review, 
is an essential and effective system in ensuring that inconsistent or unfair 
decisions do not deprive citizens of their rights, however the law alone sadly 
cannot ensure good administration in Sierra Leone. It is in this vein that the 
following recommendations are made in the next section. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Judicial review of administrative decisions in general is seen as important and 
useful in most countries especially in Sierra Leone; however it may be 
                                                 
49  These views are confirmed in the cases of Cinnamond v British Airport Authority [1980] 2 All ER 368 
(CA) (Per Lord Denning) and Bushell v Secretary of the State for the Environment [1981] AC 75 (HL) (Per 
Lord Diplock).  
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inadequate in its efficiency if the quality of decision making bodies is not 
improved. This is why the improvement of the quality of administrative 
decision-making is suggested as one of the most effective method of 
protecting individual and social rights against government encroachment in 
Africa (Chongwe, 1989; 620) and Sierra Leone is no exception. And to 
achieve such improvement and to give effect to the ideals of the rule of law as 
institutional morality, there needs to be a partnership between authorities and 
the courts (Woolf, et al 2007; 34).Therefore it is strongly recommended that 
judicial review needs to be supplemented by other measures to improve the 
overall quality of executive decision-making. Such measures can include; 
1. An increase in resources for civil services 
2. more and better training of administrators 
3. specialist training  
4. where there is little man-power; and increase in civil service manpower 
5. Promoting greater awareness of the legal aspects and implications of 
administrators’ work (especially where abuse and excessive power is 
used by them) through seminars, conferences and publications. 
It is pertinent to say that for Sierra Leone to implement such 
recommendations considering her present financial constraint to meet 
national obligations, it would be a very difficult using its own resources alone. 
Therefore for the realisation of these recommendations, the injection of 
monetary and technical assistance from developed jurisdictions would be of 
great value and economic and social development for both donor and 
recipient.  
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